This research presents a new application of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to empirically determine prices of multiple products. The DEA technique is now widely applied to performance analysis and efficiency measurement in economics, business and other areas in social science. This study does not explore such conventional DEA uses, rather directing towards a new DEA application to the determination of a marginal cost pricing system or a profit-based pricing system. Nonlinear properties of the new DEA approach are explored in this research.
1. Introduction Data Envelopment Analysis, first proposed by Charnes et al. (1978) , is now widely applied to performance (productivity) analysis and efficiency measurement in public and private sectors. The DEA applicability can be easily confirmed in the bibliography prepared by Seiford (1996) in which this study can find more than 500 previous DEA research efforts, including Sueyoshi (1991 Sueyoshi ( , 1992a Sueyoshi ( ,b,c, 1994 .
Admitting the importance of such previous DEA contributions in efficiency analysis, this article needs to mention that DEA can serve as an empirical basis for determining market prices of multiple commodities. Unfortunately, such type of DEA applications have been not sufficiently explored in the conventional studies. [Exceptions may be found in Sueyoshi (1995c Sueyoshi ( , 1996c .] To extend DEA further into a pricing mechanism, this article incorporates important economic concepts regarding pricing policy (e.g., a demand curve, an equilibrium market price, and market competition) into an DEA algorithmic framework. Thus, this research attempts to explore how a market price is determined in the DEA framework. [This article believes that DEA price-setting issue is as important as its traditional efficiency and productivity measurement. This article is a small but important step of such a new DEA research direct ion .]
The remaining structure of this article is organized as follows: The next (2) section reviews DEA from the perspective of its efficiency measurement. Section 3 discusses how DEA can be incorporated into a pricing mechanism. Nonlinear properties of an DEA pricing scheme are discussed in this section, as well. DEA pricing rule and efficiency concepts are presented in Section 4. After applying the proposed DEA approach to an illustrative data set, the next section (5) discusses the importance of the DEA-based pricing approach. Finally, conclusion and future research extensions are summarized in the last (6) section.
2. Traditional DEA Models DEA has been long considered as a data-oriented approach for relatively evaluating the performance of a group of entities referred to as "Decision Making Units (DMus)". In the DEA framework, DMus are regarded as decisional entities responsible for converting multiple inputs to outputs. Examples of such DMus include local authority departments, schools, hospitals, shops, bank branches, and other entities whose production activities are characterized by multiple inputs-outputs.
The original DEA model, first referred to as "CCR-ratio form" (Charnes et al., 1978) , has opened up a new nonparametric scheme for the measurement of production-based efficiency. An important feature of DEA is that it promises analytical advantages in a case of the absence of need for the assignment of the supposed relative importance of various outputs and inputs. DEA also eliminates the need to explicitly specify underlying functional relationship that is supposed to analytically prescribe the relationship between inputs and outputs, as found in conventional parametric studies.
Hereafter, to initiate our mathematical description on the conventional use of DEA, this article starts with an assumption that there are n DMus, denoted by j E J = {j 1 A j > 0, and 6 > 0, where A, ( j = 1, --, n ) is used to express a convex ball for connecting all the data points (X,, Y,} and its sum is restricted by its upper (ub 2 1) and lower (0 <: lb <^ 1) bounds in (1). The level of production-based DEA efficiency is determined by the optimal 6' score of (1).
The dual form of (1) becomes
Here, V and Z are two row vectors of dual variables related to the first and second sets of constraints of ( l ) , respectively. Furthermore, both 0-1 and 0-2 are dual variables derived from the last constraint of (1). The production-based DEA (1) can be further extendible to cost-based DEA measurement. In this case, it is assumed that each DMU can access the information regarding an input price (row) vector (W,). Given Wk and Yk, the minimized cost of the specific kth DMU is measured by the following DEA model (Tone, 1993, and Sueyoshi, 1995a Here, the column vector X = (xl, --, represents a vector of decision variables representing (unknown) input quantities. The level of cost-based DEA efficiency is determined by the ratio of cl to ck (Sueyoshi, 1995a) . More formally, it becomes as follows:
Cost-Based DEA efficiency = ci/ck = WkX*/WkXk.
The dual form of (3) becomes
Here, V and Z are row vectors of dual variables related to the first and second sets of constraints of (3), respectively. The two dual variables o1 and o2 are related to the last constraint of (3).
Comparing (2) with (5), this study needs to describe two important differences between these dual forms. First, a structural difference can be identified in the last equation related to V. That is, VXk = 1 is required to be incorporated in (2), while the equation is changed to V <: Wk in (5). All the other constraints and the objective are exactly same in both (2) and (5). Second, the complementary slackness condition of linear programming proves that if X* > 0, then V* = Wk is maintained at optimality of (5), indicating that each component of V* equals to its corresponding input price of the kth DMU if all the components of X are all positive. Here, it is important to note that some component of Z* may become zero since Z* is not restricted as found in V*. Therefore, some form of restriction on Z in (5) is needed to avoid such zero in V*, consequently obtaining an acceptable DEA result. [See, for example, Shang and Sueyoshi (1995) and Sueyoshi (1995b Sueyoshi ( , 1996a This section presents important properties related to DEA pricing mechanism and its derived equilibrium market price. In an effort to describe such a price setting scheme, this research reformulates the cost-based DEA model (3) to the following profit-based DEA:
Ib
Ai 5 ub, X 3 0, Y > 0, and A, > 0.
Here, Y is a (column) vector representing decision variables and Pk(Y) is a (row) vector representing commodity prices. The objective of (6) indicates a total profit that is expressed by subtracting the total cost (WkX) from the total revenue (Pk(Y)Y).
An important feature of the price vector Pk(Y) is that it has S components (r = 1, + .
. , S ) and the magnitude of each component depends upon its output quantity. For research convenience, this study assumes that the rth component of Pk(Y) can be expressed by a linear inverse demand curve: pk( yr ) = ar -br yr ( r = l , --. , S). Hence, the total revenue may are, respectively, parameter coefficients to be measured by regression analysis. Thus, (6) can be considered as the maximization of a quadratic problem with linear constraints which produces the following profit-based DEA index:
Hereafter, this article needs to provide the following three comments on the inverse demand curve. First, this study is fully aware of the fact that there are other types of inverse demand curves. This research employs the linear form for research convenience.
[Nonlinear demand curves need to be explored in the near future.] Second, the two parameter coefficients can be estimated by conventional regression methods such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Least Absolute Value (LAV) estimation. Lastly, the rth price elasticity of demand is measured by
since pr = ar -bryr and 9pr/9yr = -br.
In order to compute (6), this study proposes the following algorithmic process:
Step 1: Estimate the parameter coefficients (ar and br) of the linear inverse demand curve via regressing the rth total revenue (Rr = aryr -bry2} by yr and y2 ( r = 1, . . , S).
Let and b: (r = 1, -, S ) be resulting parameter estimates.
Step 2: Apply Lernke7s Complementary Pivoting Algorithm to (6) after incorporating such parameter estimates into the objective of (6).
This computational process seeks for an DEA equilibrium point between producers and consumers. [A detailed description on Lernke7s Complementary Pivoting Algorithm can be found in his research effort of Lemke (1962) and many text books such as Bazaraa and Shetty (1979) . We can easily access many computer softwares (e.g., LINDO by Schrage (1991) and QSB by Chang and Sullivan (1991) ), incorporating the Lemke's algorithm to solve quadratic problems.]
A Visual Description on DEA Pricing Mechanism
Figures 1 and 2 depict a structural change from a price vector P t o P' due to a change in the magnitude of an output vector. The two coordinates of Figure 1 represent the magnitude of two outputs (yl and y2) along with these prices and p^). In this figure there are 6 DMus (from A to F), among which A is inefficient but the others are efficient. An efficiency frontier may be depicted as the contour line (B-C-D-E-F) in Figure 1 . A price vector of A (an DMU) is expressed by P = (pl, p2). Along with the given P, A can maximize its profit on C by increasing its outputs (Ayl, Ay2). The conventional use of DEA ends its description after the incremental change in Y. However, the DEA pricing mechanism proposed here does not end its description because the incremental change of Y is linked to the reducing change of P. Such a change may be visually explained in Figure 2 . As indicated above, the production level (yl, y2) of A is changed to (yl + Ayl, y2 + Ay2) which requires the reduction of commodity (output) prices along with these price elasticities, expressed by the two lines of Figure 2 . The reduced price vector is measured by P' = (pl -Apl, pa -Apa) in Figure 1 . Along with P', the profit-maximizing point is shift from C to E in Figure 1 . This iterative process between Y and P is repeated many times until it converges to a market equilibrium point. At the end of this subsection, this article needs to mention that the above two figures do not incorporate the perspective of a cost behavior in order to avoid a descriptive difficulty. Such feature will be discussed from an analytical view, hereafter, in detail.
DEA Pricing Properties
In order to maintain descriptive simplicity, this study first reformulates DEA (6) as the following problem (P): This study further reformulates the problem (P) by changing the inequality of the first ( X ) constraints into equality:
Maximize
It is important to note that two problems (P) and (Q) do not have a major difference in their formulations. However, the reformulation from (P) to (Q) provides its DEA feasible region with compactness ( a closed and bounded set), simultaneously eliminating slack variables related to the first constraints. The compactness of the DEA feasible region attains the tractability of our theoretical extension concerning DEA pricing optimality.
Proposition 1: Problem (Q) always has an optimal solution.
[Proof] The feasible region of problem (Q) is compact. Hence, the existence of an optimal solution is immediately obtained from the property of compactness.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2: Let (X*, y, A*) be an optimal solution of problem (Q). Then, the solution is optimal to problem (P).
[Proof] Let (X,, 6, Ap) be a feasible solution of problem (P). eliminates the slack vector to obtain the following right hand side:
Meanwhile, (X*, y, X) is a feasible solution of ~r o b l e m (P) and hence, it is an optimal solution to problem (P).
Q.E.D. 1 becomes negative definite.
Proposition 4:
The Kuhn-Tucker condition of problem (Q) is necessary and sufficient to the optimality of problem (P). Q.E.D.
Extension
As presented previously, it might be convenient to determine output prices, using only cost (c) and output quantities (V). In such a case, DEA (6) may be reformulated as follows (Sueyoshi, 1995f This article can further extend the applicability of (6) by incorporating a budget constraint into its formulation. The structure of (6) may be reformulated by including the following additional constraint :
implying that the expenditure (WkX) of the kth DMU must be at most equal to his/her budget limit (bgt). The hyperplane ( W k X ) is called a "wealth hyperplane" in economics (e.g., Debreu, 1959) . [See Sueyoshi (1995a) In order to estimate marginal costs related to multiple commodities, this study returns to the optimal condition between (1) and (4) which can be expressed by
The left hand side of (12) indicates the minimum cost (6 = WkX*) of the kth DMU, where X* are optimal solutions of (l); while Z*, 0: and o; are optimal solutions of (4). For descriptive simplicity, this study assumes that these DEA solutions are uniquely determined by (1) and (4). [See Sueyoshi (1996b) which discusses how t o deal with multiple solutions.]
As identified in Sueyoshi (1996b) , c = X * Y + cr',lb -o*ub becomes a supporting hyperplane at (ck, Yk). Therefore, a slope of the hyperplane is measured by
The left hand side of (13) is the definition of marginal costs which are equivalent to dual variables ( g , & -. . , g ) of DEA dual form (4). Thus, this study can estimate marginal cost prices, using the dual variable vector Z*. The marginal costs imply multiple commodity prices when the profit of the kth DMU is expected to be zero. Thus, the resulting marginal costs can serve a theoretical basis to determine service charges of public utilities.
Profit-Based Pricing Rule
The profit-based pricing is a straight forward matter. As proved in Proposition 5 of the previous section, the Kuhn-Tuker (K-T) conditions indicate the existence of U' = (> O), implying that the ith Lagrangian multiplier of U," equals to the ith input price of the kth DMU.
Furthermore, the K-T conditions prove that the rth output price a t optimality becomes positive such as p; = a, -bryT > 0 if y ' > 0 is maintained. Thus, (6) or (9) may be used for the price determination of multiple commodities produced in private economy. [See Kaplan (1982, p.224) in which a shortcoming of profit-based pricing is discussed from an accounting perspective.]
Price Index
Based upon the fact that p* ( r = l, ---, S ) can serve as a theoretical basis for the price determination, this study uses the following Price Index (PI) for the rth commodity of the kth DMU (Sueyoshi, 1 9 9 5~) :
as an index number. Here, prk indicates the rth observed price of the kth DMU and is the corresponding DEA equilibrium price measured by (6). The P I can be further extended to the following Average Price Index (API):
Efficiency Concepts
Using DEA results from ( l ) , this article defines the following efficiency concepts (Sueyoshi, 1995a): Definition 1 "Overall Efficiency (OE)" of a DMU (Xk, Yk) is measured by (3) after setting (ub, lb) = (1, 1) in (1).
Definition 2 "Overall and Scale Efficiency (OSE)" of a DMU (Xk, Yk) is measured by (3) after setting (ub,lb) = ( m , 0 ) in (1). Definition 3 "Cost-Scale Efficiency (CSE)" of a DMU (Xk, Yk) is measured by CSE= OSEIOE.
In the above definitions, the term "scale" is included to express an assumption that constant returns-to-scale is incorporated in DEA.
Next, using (6), this study defines the following indexes:
Definition 4 "Profit Index" of a DMU (Xk,Yk) is measured by (7) after setting (ub, lb) =
( 1 , l ) in (6).
Definition 5 "Profit and Scale Index" of a DMU (Xk, Yk) is measured by (7) after setting (ub, lb) = (m, 0) in (6).
The "efficiencyn measure always exists between 0% and 100%, while the "index" measure may be below 0% or above 100%. This article uses the two terms (i.e., efficiency and index) in order to distinguish such a difference.
5. An Illustrative Example It is important to note two comments. First, this illustration compares output prices with equilibrium market prices that are analytically computed by the algorithm of Section 3. Second, this research admits that the implication of findings documented in this section is limited only upon the presented data set. However, using the illustrative data set, this article can confirm analytical features of an DEA-pricing system. This research believes that this article is an initial (small but important) step towards the DEA-pricing, consequently maintaining other research opportunities to be further explored in the near future. All of such are important future research extensions of this article. Table 3 documents cost-based DEA efficiency measures, all of which are obtained by solving (3) and (4). A finding from Table 3 can be summarized as follows:
Finding 1: This study cannot find any major difference between overall efficiency (OE) and overall/scale efficiency (OSE), indicating that DMus in this data set have been operating under almost constant returns to scale. Consequently, the cos t-scale efficiency (the ratio of OE to OSE) exhibits more than 99%, as listed at the last column of Table  3 . This finding is due to the nature of the data set presented in Table 1 . This article is fully aware of a possiblity that the cost-based DEA efficiency may produce other DEA results, depending upon the type of a data set.
- Table 4 Next, this research sets lb = 0 and ub = cc in the profit-based DEA (G), assuming the constant returns to scale, so as to measure profit-maximizing outputs (listed at the third and fourth columns), those related output prices (listed at the third and fourth columns), and three inputs (listed at the fourth, fifth and sixth columns), along with A estimates. The last column, labeled "Optimal Lambda," indicates a reference set and A estimate of each DMU. For example, the first DMU has A; = 0.6005 at its optimality, indicating that the second DMU is the reference DMU for the first one. All empirical results yielded by (6) are summarized in Table 4 -a. Based upon the price estimates of Table 4 -a, Table 4 -b documents price indexes (at the second and third columns) and profit index (at the last column). Findings from the two tables may be summarized in the following manner:
Finding 2: The comparison between Table 1 and Table 4 -a indicates that a market equilibrium point is attained by reducing the quantity of inputs and outputs, simultaneously increasing output prices. A reference set, by which the efficiency level of DMus is determined, includes only the second DMU, as identified at the last column of Table 4 -a.
It is important to note that the second DMU becomes a market equilibrium point on which a total revenue is maximized as formulated in (6). It is true that the conventional use of DEA produce several DMus as a reference set, serving as a basis for efficiency measurement. Furthermore, the selection of such a reference set depends upon which DMU is evaluated. Meanwhile, the market equilibrium point is determined in a whole market mechanism where supply (production) activities of producers are adjusted by both demands (consumption) of consumers and their production costs. The demands are determined by commodity prices in a market. The market mechanism converges a market equilibrium point. Consequently, the DEA pricing (6) has a much smaller reference set than conventional DEA applications, as found in Finding 2 (Table 4-a).
Finding 3: As a consequence of the above (second) finding, the two price index measures are negative for all the 20 DMUs. The average price index becomes negative as well, as identified in the fourth column of Table 4 -b. The magnitude of those negative price indexes becomes larger when the size of DMus is increased.
The above finding may be due to the fact that the best strategy to attain the largest profit is to reduce the amount of outputs (sales), simultaneously increasing these sale prices through the market mechanism. Hence, large firms need more reduction in their production (output) sizes than small ones, as found in Table 4 -b. The reduced production sizes increase commodity prices, consequently attaining the largest profit (= the increased price X the reduced output quantity). The increased prices (on the market equilibrium point) produce negative price indexes, as found in Table 4 -b. As defined previously in (14) and (15), the price index indicates (pr -p*)/pr, ( r = l , -, S), or in other words, the ratio of the difference between pr (an observed price) and p* (its equilibrium price) to the observed price.
A positive number in the price index implies that a firm needs to reduce a commodity price, simultaneously increasing its quantity. Conversely, a negative number indicates that the firm needs to increase a commodity price, simultaneously reducing its quantity. The latter strategy is applicable to all the firms in Table 4-b. [Of course, the use of such strategy may be limited upon only this data set. The structure of a data set determines the strategy.]
Finding 4: Positive profit estimates, larger than observed profits, can be found in all the DMUs. This is a straight-forward result since (6) is designed to maximize a profit of each DMU by comparing its performance with other DMUs. Furthermore, it is observed that large DMus attain more profit gains than small DMus at the equilibrium point.
The above finding is due to a fact that such increased profits are attained by both the structure of a data set and the DEA pricing mechanism. As mentioned previously, both Next, in order to examine the impact of constant returns to scale on DEA results, this research sets lb = ub = 1 in (6), then measuring profit-maximizing outputs, output prices and inputs, along with A estimates. Such DEA results are summarized in Table 5 Finding 5: The last column of Table 5 -a indicates that all the DMus are evaluated by either the or lgth DMU as a reference set. For example, the equilibrium point for the loth DMU can be found on the 1gth DMU which has the lowest cost among all the DMUs. [An exception can be found in the first DMU whose equilibrium point may be found between the 2nd and 17th DMUs.] Consequently, optimal outputs and inputs of the equilibrium point for each DMU may be found on those of the or l g t h DMU.
Finding 6: Both the two price index measures and the average price index become negative on all the DMUs, as identified in Table 5 -b. The magnitude of those negative price indexes becomes larger as the size of DMus is increased.
Finding 7: The profit estimate is positive for all the DMus except the lgth DMU.
It is also observed that large DMus attain more profit gains than small DMus at the equilibrium point. 
Conclusion and Future Extensions
This article presents a new type of DEA application to the determination of a profit-based pricing system. A unique feature of this study is that it incorporates important economic concepts (e.g., a demand function, a profit-maximizing price, and a market equilibrium) into the DEA framework. Furthermore, the new DEA approach is reformulated by nonlinear programming and its pricing properties are explored from the Kuhn-Tuker condition. Thus, this article is an initial step to enhance DEA practicality in setting multiple commodity prices. The use of the proposed DEA pricing mechanism is confirmed with an illustrative data set.
There are two future research extensions to be mentioned. First, this article accepts an assumption that we can access an input price vector (W), along with an output price vector (P) which is unknown but computable from an output quantity vector ( V ) in this study. The determination of P on a market equilibrium is the objective of this research and such market equilibrium prices are compared with real prices. Meanwhile, a conventinal use of DEA assumes that it does not depend upon such accessibility to both W and P .
It is true that if we can access such information regarding W , we should fully utilize the information. However, in many cases where we cannot obtain such information on W, DEA users can substitute W by DEA dual variables, as explored in Section 2 of this article, using some a priori information such as previous experience and theory. As an important research extension, this article will present another DEA approach for commodity pricing, omitting the need of W. This is a future research task. Another future research may be due to our research requirement, indicating that this study needs to apply the proposed DEA approach to the pricing issues of many commodities in private economics. This is another important future extension of the article. This future research task may be found in theoretical extensions on DEA pricing from the perspective of the general equilibrium theory intensively investigated in economics.
Finally, it is hoped that this article makes a small contribution on the establishment of the DEA-based price setting system.
